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I
INTRODUCTION

In reading the brochure for this conference, I became somewhat
apprehensive to find that I would be crossing pens, and perhaps swords, with
so many "economically sophisticated judges." I have had only one freshman
course on economics, in 1949 at Connecticut College for Women. Beyond
that, my qualifications for writing this article are shaky indeed: A mushy
liberal arts major at college, a three year stint at Yale Law School (the old
version), a brief touchdown in private practice with Thurman Arnold, and
stints in theJohn Kennedy and Jimmy Carter Justice Departments interrupted
by forays into legal services and public interest law. Even my seven years'
experience with the heavy regulatory caseload of the D.C. Circuit qualifies me,
at best, for amateur status. My nonpedigreed origins are, however, shared by
the vast majority of my judicial colleagues. Thus, the remarks contained in
this article on the limits of law and economics in judicial decisionmaking,
however naive, may serve to forewarn the converted about pitfalls that lie
ahead in persuading economically unsophisticated judges to abandon Karl
Llewellyn's Bramble Bush I for Judge Posner's Economic Analysis of the Law. 2
First, let me surface some genuine perplexities about the implications of
using the law and economics methodology at all. Can a judge really use
economic decisionmaking-at least the way its foremost advocates explain itonly when she so desires, without swallowing the profound philosophical
implications it entails for the role of law in society? Can we in the judiciary
really be just a "little bit pregnant" with this new movement or will the
economics part, like Rosemary's Baby, ultimately devour its legal host?
Second, assuming that economic analytical tools can be used to solve specific
problems without a commitment to the full-fledged law and economics vision
of society, there may be troublesome constraints that flow from the "law" side
of law and economics and inhere in the traditional model of a judge as an
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arbitrator of disputes between the parties before the court. There are also
limitations stemming from the "economics" side of the union, specifically
from some of the underlying assumptions and the sometimes
incomprehensible language of economics. Finally, this article will discuss
problems with two areas of judicial activity where some law and economics
proponents would have judges move: basing judges' rulings on predicting
behavior ex ante and "at the margin," and interpreting statutes as interest
group bargains.
II
WHAT IS LAW AND ECONOMICS?

Several years ago, in discussing the more modest enterprise of judicial
review of cost-benefit analyses, I concluded that:
[t]he gradual introduction of sophisticated economic concepts and techniques into the
[legal] system ... offers great promise for heightening the rationality of ... judicial

review, but equally great caution is in order to insure that they never be allowed to
replace justice with cant,3 or to frustrate genuine judicial understanding of what is
involved in each dispute.

My recent reading in the field of law and economics, however, reveals the
need to focus on the premises, rather than the promises, of economic analysis.
Although some of its proponents eschew the notion that economics can
4
provide a comprehensive and all encompassing philosophy of jurisprudence,
others do not. 5 Major economic theorists certainly believe that a free market
economy enabling maximum free choice by individuals generally maximizes
social wealth. This view is Shared even by the so called "liberal" practitioners
of law and economics who are, however, more likely to believe that the actual
marketplace suffers from imperfections. 6 The major role of courts-and even
legislatures-is to back up the free marketplace, leaving a limited role for
government to play in advancing equality, redistributing wealth or power, and
protecting particular groups from exploitation. The private ordering
preferences of the law and economics movement are overt and unabashed.
Many law and economics advocates, among them Judge Bork, assure
judges that there exists a middle road between "an enthusiasm so overdone
that it leads to the delusion that all of the law's problems can usefully be
analyzed through economics . . .[and] nihilistic delusion that price theory is
7
so far removed from a science that it is virtually useless anywhere in the law."
They suggest that judges can pick up or set down the powerful tools of
economic analysis like a slide rule, at will. Can that be true, or is a little
3.
4.
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economic knowledge in the hands of a judge a dangerous thing? Right now
the most troublesome limitation on judicial use of economic analysis is the
limits of a judge's ability to analyze its techniques and ascertain the extent to
which they incorporate assumptions that she is not ready to accept. It may not
be easy, or even sensible, for judges to use economic analysis here and
there--"on the margin," if you will-to the extent that analysis is fueled by
controversial, powerful, and purposefully comprehensive assumptions about
human beings, society, and courts.
Some, like Judge Posner, might say this concern comes too late-that
courts already operate primarily to further utilitarian ends consistent with the
tenets of economics." My own feeling is that the ad hoc pragmatism ofjudges,
in conjunction with their diverse backgrounds, has thus far prevented the
judiciary from becoming a vehicle for the advancement of any powerful new
(or maybe old) ideology encompassing the whole of economic, social, and
political relationships. Arguably, judges should not abandon that mode for a
seductively more organized or coherent decisionmaking framework without
fully understanding its assumptions and implications and without exploring
whether they can somehow use some but not all of it. Law and economics
advocates have the burden of proof in showing judges how their ideology and
techniques can be separated, if indeed they can.
Concerns about whether any monolithic economic vision should be
incorporated wholesale into judicial decisionmaking are heightened by the
fluid nature of law and economics itself. In one sense, the healthy controversy
and dissension within the law and economics movement about key concepts is
encouraging. These assumptions include: (1) the role of altruism, loyalty,
benevolence, rage, and jealousy in individual behavior; 9 (2) whether courts
maximize social wealth better than legislatures;' 0 (3) whether a more equal
distribution of income or wealth would reduce efficiency and threaten
liberty;"I and (4) whether there is evidence for the assumption that individuals
bent on optimizing their own preferences will act in harmony over the long
haul so as to maximize social good as well.' 2 At the same time, however, these
debates make economic philosophy a moving target. For a judge to embark
intelligently on a law and economics mode of decisionmaking, she would
initially have to devote a great deal of time to probing the underlying
assumptions and goals of the movement and then decide, in light of much
debate and conflict, which assumptions she agrees with and which tools of
economic analysis incorporate those assumptions but not the others.
8. I refer, of course, to Judge Posner's "positive" description of the common law-a category
in which he includes at least half the business of the federal courts-as consisting of decisions made
by judges "as if their goal were to promote economic efficiency." R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS:
CRISIS AND REFORM 314 (1985).
9.
G. AKERLOF, AN ECONOMIC THEORIST'S BOOK OF TALES 1-4 (1984); Hirshleifer, supra note 5,

at 36-37, 51-52.
10. Note, The Inefficient Common Law, 92 YALE LJ. 862, 885-87 (1983).
11. G. STIGLER, THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE: ESSAYS ON REGULATION 6-8, 14-19 (1977).
12. Hirshleifer, supra note 5, at 6-8, 49-54.
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In short, law and economics is a serious and controversial intellectual
movement, not a fad with which one should lightly ally. That having been
said, it is time to move off of this disturbing but very fundamental limit, and
on to some of the more practical limits in applying economic analysis
techniques in judicial decisionmaking.
III
THE ROLE OF THE COURTS AND THE LIMITS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

Let us begin with some specific problems which grow out of the
constraints of the judicial role. The truism that judicial analysis, economic or
otherwise, takes place only in the context of lawsuits between two or more
parties imposes a practical constraint on the judge's ability to use economic
analysis, particularly when the judge is economically unsophisticated. Such a
judge will, for the most part, be limited by what the parties serve up to her.
Beyond this practical problem, bothersome questions lurk behind the
economists' vision of the role of courts in our society. While judges often
make general policy in the process of deciding specific cases, their rationales
and rulings should not, as some economists urge, ignore or demote the
interests of the parties before them.
A.

Problems of Competence

Judges in the D.C. Circuit review a lot of federal agency cost-benefit
analyses which, at least some of the time, have been produced by real
economists. Even reviewing somebody else's economic analysis, however,
poses problems for the untrained judge who cannot "talk directly to the
economists, question the experts, or ensure that every piece of relevant
information finds its way into the record." 1 3 It is infinitely harder to work out
the appropriate economic analysis de novo. Judges rely on parties to frame the
issues, and serious problems of competence are raised by suggestions that
courts should sua sponte invoke and rely on economic principles to decide a
case when the parties have not argued the case that way.
In the absence of guidance from the parties, a judge cannot know which
economic precepts should be applied to the case at hand or how those
precepts should be applied. No immutable set of economic commandments
exists to which all economists have sworn fidelity. The Judicial Canons of
Economic Construction have not yet been issued, although they are probably
in the making. Even if a judge decides that economic analysis is appropriate,
she is faced with the choice among classical or neoclassical Chicago School
economists, who usually assume that the market is functioning efficiently, and
Keynesian liberal economists or post-Chicago School revisionists, who are
more likely to spot market failures requiring state intervention.' 4 While in
13.
14.

Wald, supra note 3, at 46.
A. BUCHANAN, ETHICS, EFFICIENCY, AND THE MARKET 19-26 (1985); Note, supra note 6, at 979.
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some cases different approaches might yield the same result, in other cases
"different economic approaches speak to identical issues differently." 15
A judge applying economic analysis in a case where the parties have not
chosen to frame their dispute in economic terms will have nothing to go on
other than her own knowledge, the published literature, or maybe a law clerk
with a Ph.D. in economics (not unheard of these days). If these sources
present alternative economic approaches yielding opposite results, the judge
must choose among them. Her choice could presumably be based on what
appeals to her intuitively, the philosophy of the economics school for judges
she has most recently attended, or the views of trade magazines to which she
subscribes. If she knows of only one approach, is it fair to the parties to
decide the case on the basis of that approach? Can consistency in circuit law
survive if different judges choose different modes of economic analysis?
Finally, why should a judge do all this work if the parties have not asked for
such an analysis? The only discerning answer to the last question may be that
a concern for the social good demands it. That answer, however, brings us
back to the controversial assertion that the assumptions of market-based
analysis are the ones for judges to follow in decisionmaking.
Even a judge who is comfortable applying self-taught economic techniques
can run into problems with lack of data. In reviewing cost-benefit analyses
conducted by agencies, for example, the D.C. Circuit Court sometimes
concludes that the agency lacked sufficient evidence from which to draw its
conclusions; in such cases, however, a judge can remand to the agency to
gather additional data. 16 If, where the parties have spent years assembling the
economic basis for their case, information can still be lacking, what about
lawsuits where the parties have not even framed the issues in economic terms?
Yet without adequate data the court can only do a qualitative balancing type
of economic analysis, the end result of which would not look much different
from the unfettered balancing courts already perform on a daily basis.
Even assuming that all the necessary data and expertise were available for
judges to draw on, would economic analyses make decisionmaking easier or
more reliable? Given the overload of the courts, most judges will hesitate to
further complicate decisionmaking unless they are reasonably sure that the
benefits of the new technique outweigh its costs. Although true believers
would argue that economics is the only way to make decisions, agnostics
would counter that well intentioned policymakers accompanied by mounds of
data, graphs, charts, and aides regularly produce economic analyses of
uncertain reliability. Highly respected economic policy analysts such as Alice
Rivlin have pointed out that information overloads can either paralyze
7 If
decisionmakers or lure them into simplistic and unrealistic solutions.'
15.
(1983).
16.
analysis
benefits
17.
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judges cannot rely on the staff and the computer programs that the
professional economists use for their not-so-reliable assessments, how can
judges be sure that their rudimentary efforts at forecasting by music-man
techniques will not accomplish more harm than good? In the Music Man,
Professor Harold Hill tells his students to "think" the tune; is it enough to tell
judges to "think economically?"
For all these reasons, judges should think twice about applying general
techniques of economic analysis in cases where the parties have not framed
the case in economic terms. Perhaps if enough judges demand enough
economic analyses, it will prompt more litigants to supply them. Until then,
those economically unsophisticated judges who embark on economic
excursions of their own without adequate training or a responsible tour guide
are of questionable use to both the litigants and the ultimate social good.
B.

Doing Justice Between the Parties

Most parties who come to court are more interested in winning their case
than in providing the court with an opportunity to lay down generalized rules
of behavior for others. Frequent litigators such as the government, large
industrial groups, and insurance companies are exceptions, of course, since
they have a bigger stake in precedent and judicial rules.' 8 As things now
stand, however, general rules are more the by-product than the primary goal
of judicial decisionmaking.
Advocates of economic analysis by judges, however, focus almost
exclusively on the rulemaking aspects of the judge's role. For them, courts
are and should be yet another societal mechanism for inducing behavior
which promotes wealth maximization and efficiency in resource allocation.
Thus, judges should worry less about "fair" treatment of the parties before
them-whose loss or gain has already occurred-and more about the future
effects of their rulings on others who have yet to act. 19
The economists' vision differs from the more traditional view that a
primary role of judges is to do justice between the parties. 20 Indeed, many
define the sin ofjudicial activism as turning away from the dispute at hand to
focus on broader questions of social policy. Yet what else are economists'
"rules" but economic and social policy? At the end of the day, is there all that
much difference between Professor Chayes' public-policy-oriented, 2 ' and
Judge Easterbrook's economics-oriented, judiciary?22
Obviously, judges must and do entertain concerns about the future effect
of their rulings. From time immemorial, they have tested the consequences of
their rulings in particular cases against other and different potential fact
18. Note, supra note 10, at 878, 878 n.64, 885.
19.

Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98

4, 10-12 (1984).
20. This vision of the role of judges dates back at least to the time of DeTocqueville. A.
DETocQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 90 (G. Laurence trans. 1966).
21. See generally Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976).
22. See Easterbrook, supra note 4.
HARV. L. REV.
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situations. 23 Acknowledging this, however, is not the same as acquiescing to a
notion that "justice between the parties" is a second level priority, nor is it a
giveaway signal that the judge lacks economic sophistication. 24 "Guideline"
rulings, even by the Supreme Court, have always been viewed skeptically
among judges; deciding important and controversial issues not before the
court is dangerous both because the issues may not have been adequately
explored by the parties and because it prematurely silences debate among
scholars and lower courts. 25 Before judges can become convinced that courts
should make their primary focus the creation of general rules, they need some
better answers to several questions.
First, why must the courts function as still another decisionmaking
institution devoted to wealth maximization? There are plenty of societal
decisionmaking institutions whose primary function is or should be to lay
down general rules of behavior designed to promote efficiency: Congress, the
Executive, and administrative agencies. In fact, Judge Posner defines activism
as judicial intrusion upon the legitimate policymaking spheres of these
coordinate branches. 2 6 Furthermore, if, as some economists contend,
Congress and the Executive have not promoted efficiency, why place this
responsibility on the courts rather than trying to improve the focus and
awareness of the democratically elected Congress or President? While an
investment in converting or appointing an empathetic judiciary may yield
better long term dividends in advancing economists' objectives, that is not
necessarily an official tenet of their philosophy.
Perhaps in a comprehensive law and economics framework all societal
institutions should be oriented toward wealth maximization.
However,
because more modest proponents, including some economists, 2 7 admit that
efficiency is not the only worthwhile societal goal, it must be legitimate to have
some societal decisionmakers focusing on other values. Many economists
prefer to focus on efficiency and leave "unfairness"--alias disparities in
distribution of income, wealth, power, or opportunity-to someone else.
Nevertheless, many important legal disputes involve precisely the issue of how
such benefits are to be distributed-someone will lose and someone will win
or a third party "externality" will be significantly affected. 28 Before the courts
abandon their traditional role of being the "someone else" to whom
23. Even in practicing what my colleague Judge Edwards calls "focused adjudication," judges
assess the effects of their rulings on future litigants by extrapolating from the situation of the parties
in front of the court. This assessment differs from what Judge Edwards terms "wide-angle
adjudication," which involves a broader inquiry into the fields of social and economic life potentially
affected by the ruling. Edwards, The Role ofJudge in Modern Society: Some Reflections on Current Practicein
FederalAppellate Adjudication, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 385, 411-12 (1983-84).

24.

Cf Easterbrook, supra note 19, at 12.
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Shapiro, Mr.Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 HARV. L. REV. 293, 341 (1976).
R. POSNER, supra note 8, at 208-11.
27. Markovits, Legal Analysis and the Economic Analysis ofAllocative Efficiency, 8 HOFsTIR L. REV. 81114, 891-92 (1980); Samuels & Mercuro, Posnerian Law & Economics on the Bench, 4 INT'L REV. L. &
ECON. 107, 110-14 (1984); Comment, PosnerianJurisprudenceand Economic Analysis of Law: The View from
the Bench, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 1162 (1985).

26.

28.
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disadvantaged individuals and groups can turn for "justice," judges need to
know who-if anyone-will take over that role.
If law and economics proponents are saying only that judges should be
aware of what economic principles can tell us about the efficiency implications
of one rule versus another, we might concede gracefully to their position.
However, it appears that at least some of them are saying a great deal more:
Even if the result is unfair vis-a-vis the parties before the court under
traditional equity standards, courts should primarily look at the efficiency, or
wealth maximizing effect of a rule as assessed by predicting the future
behavior of others not before the court. Thus, Judge Easterbrook warns that
"muddy" rules result from trying "to accommodate the needs of parties
caught in a web of circumstances," and praises the Supreme Court for, in one
case, "bypassing for the most part . . . [plaintiff's] case in order to examine
how rules affect future behavior." 2 9 As judges have known for years, framing
the issue in a case is three-fourths of the battle. Frankly, I think ajudge ought
to be cautious about routinely converting the issues put to her by the parties
in terms of their own dispute into broad, all-encompassing questions about
general rules for social behavior.
In deciding what is fair or just in individual cases, of course, judges must
consider what the chosen norm will mean for others similarly situated. The
judges' primary focus, however, is on the relationships and actions of the
parties before them and not on making a rule for all seasons and situations.
Rather than ignoring the parties' needs, judges try to learn what the parties'
"web of circumstances" can teach them. It is hard to accept the economists'
assumption that everything that has happened to the parties is a "sunk cost"
with little or no relevance to the desired outcome of the dispute. The idea
that the rights and wrongs of individuals are subordinate to some greater
common good is not an alien concept in the law, but it probably should not be
embraced as the fundamental precept of all judicial decisionmaking.
I can illustrate my concerns with the following example from my legal
service days. We were fighting for an implied warranty of habitability so that a
slum landlord could not collect rent for an uninhabitable dwelling.30 Our
argument was based in part on a notion of fairness between landlord and
tenant. A judge in an economic predictive mode might conclude-and would
have been right in many instances-that slum landlords would abandon their
properties rather than repair them and that poor people would therefore have
fewer housing options. Should they then refrain from finding a warranty of
habitability? I think not, because to do so they would have had to totally
disregard the overwhelming differences in bargaining power between slum
landlords and tenants.
In short, a judge's present notions of equity and justice between the
parties, however untidy, already include reasonable, sometimes even
29. Easterbrook, supra note 19, at 7, 21.
30. See Javins v. First Nat'l. Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 925
(1970).
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sophisticated, predictions or judgments about the causes and effects of human
behavior. Economic analysis may aid in those predictions, but judges' current
emphasis on deciding the cases before them should not be foregone in favor
of accepting a different and more amorphous role as a "social wealth
maximizer."
IV
WHERE NOT TO USE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

Robert Cooter has written that while "[t]here may be some areas of law
which can be explained by economics, .

.

. there are other areas of law in

which economic explanations will always be incomplete." 3' 1 I turn now from
the limitations of the "law" to the limitations of "economics" to suggest
where the use of economic analysis may or may not be legitimate.
Unfortunately, most law and economics proponents have done little to
help delineate the appropriate boundaries of economic analysis. Just as Judge
Easterbrook has advised judges that they should more often focus on where
not to apply a particular statute than on how to apply it,32 so, too, judges need
guidance on when to use and not to use economic analysis. Too much of the
literature has ignored a very practical question that arises for judges who are
open to the use of economic analysis: How, especially in the absence of
guidance by the parties, is a judge to separate those cases in which economic
techniques will be helpful from those where it will not (or even from those
cases in which it will be harmful)?
Two of the most important limitations of economics are its underlying
assumptions and its language. First, and most important, the very nature of
some legal issues renders them inappropriate for economic analysis. Second,
the language of economics will sometimes cloud, rather than clarify, the issues
at hand and make unacceptable a resolution of the dispute in economic terms.
A.

Limitations Based on Economic Assumptions

How does a judge spot a case in which economic analysis will be helpful?
According to Judge Bork, economics is a method of reasoning which "works
only when you are dealing with things that are comparable. That is why
economics has produced its most valuable results and insights when dealing
with the behavior of persons and firms in real markets, where dollars may be
used as measuring units." 3 3 Clearly, economic analysis makes sense in cases
involving real market transactions, such as contracts and antitrust where
"economic facts" lie at the core of the case.
However, the usefulness of economic analysis extends beyond actual
market transactions. Professor Bruce Ackerman notes that economics is a
31. Cooter, Law and the Imperialism of Economics: An Introduction to the Economic Analysis of Law and a
Review of the Major Books, 29 UCLA L. REV. 1260, 1266 (1982).
32. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CH. L. REV. 533 (1983).
33. Bork, supra note 7, at 22.
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form of discourse employed by people involved in bargaining and which can
be extended to cases involving "hypothetical bargaining, by real world
people."' 34 In such cases economic techniques can help judges to identify the
terms that the parties "would have agreed upon, ex ante, if transaction costs
3 5
had not made it impossible to deal with one another before [they] collided."Torts is an obvious example of a legal subject involving hypothetical
bargaining by real world people-or at least "reasonable" prototypes thereof.
In torts cases, courts imply that one person has a duty toward another, even
when the parites have not agreed that any such duty exists. In effect, the
courts infer what the parties would have agreed upon had they met "before
they collided." Thus, torts has involved economic analysis since at least 1947
when Judge Learned Hand declared that negligence should be defined as the
point at which the marginal benefit to society of taking additional care was
36
greater than the marginal cost to society of that care.
Even Professor Ackerman acknowledges, however, that there are some
legal topics which are effectively off limits to economic analysis because
bargaining metaphors are inappropriate; we cannot or would not ever
imagine bargaining over such issues. 3 7 For example, economic analysis is
peculiarly unsuited to constitutional and statutory causes of action designed
to protect people against racial, gender, or ethnic discrimination based solely
on prejudices. While the marketplace may accept the validity of such
38
prejudices, the legal system does not.
Generally, economic analysis is not helpful whenever the assumptions
incorporated into economics run fundamentally counter to the rights, duties,
or values implicit in our Constitution as interpreted by the courts. Professor
Laurence Tribe has identified a "constitutive" role for the courts in defining
"the sort of society we are to be." '39 Similarly, Judge Edward Spaeth has
argued that judges have a duty "to hold up before us the sort of society we
desire, so that we may be helped, not simply to live by our ideals, but to gain
in our understanding of what our ideals are and what they may require of
us. ' 40 Judge Linde of the Oregon Supreme Court thinks that courts must and
' 4
do "shape people's vision of their Constitution and of themselves. " '
Unfortunately, as Professor Tribe has argued, an undue emphasis on
economic analysis allows judges to evade this role and ignore issues of power
and powerlessness, public purpose and private interest, the nature of our laws
42
and Constitution, and the mission of courts vis-a-vis our political system.
34.

Ackerman, Foreword: Talking and Trading, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 899, 903 (1985) (emphasis in

original).
35.

Id.

36. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
37. Ackerman, supra note 34, at 904.
38. See Markovits, supra note 27, at 873.
39.
606-14
40.
41.
42.

Tribe, ConstitutionalCalculus: EqualJustice or Economic Efficiency?, 98 HARV. L. REV. 592, 595,
(1985).
Spaeth, Where isthe High Court Heading?, JUDGES, Summer 1985, at 48.
Linde,Judges, Critics, and the Realist Tradition, 82 YALE LJ. 227, 239 (1972).
Tribe, supra note 39, at 592-93, 620-21.
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Thus Judge Spaeth finds the same Court which Judge Easterbrook lauds for
its economically astute rulings to be "drifting," with "no sure sense of
values," casually costing out human life and other fundamental liberties
43
against social efficiency.
For at least some of its champions, economics provides the certainty that
all seek, a safe harbor from capricious judges, and stability in the midst of
chaos. Such certitude, however, may never be achievable, particularly in
constitutional adjudication, which has been aptly described by Professor Gene
Nichol as "a meandering process by which we seek to assure political and
social equality, to etch out those freedoms secured to autonomous
44
individuals, and to define and express ourselves as a society."
Even if legal certainty were possible, society-including judges-would
pay a heavy price for it. Economic analysis inevitably results in judicial
deference to the executive, which has a vastly greater expertise at costing out
conflicts and identifying the administrative and managerial costs of a
particular rule or policy. 4 5 The resort solely to economic analysis bespeaks, in
the words of Judge Spaeth, a "loss of nerve" 46 on the part of judges in
assuming their constitutive role. While economics may seem like a neutral
science, "economists' solutions depend as much on their conception of the
public good as on their technical algorithms. As a result, for good or ill,
economics is as influential for its implicit ethical theory as for its
predictions.- 4 7
The price of economic "certainty" may be reducing
constitutional law to a battlefield on which economists continuously joust.
My own, largely pragmatic, view falls somewhere between those who
would resolve all disputes by economic analysis, and those who would confine
the beast to its antitrust and regulatory cage. Economic analysis obviously has
widespread utility, although even in those areas where it dominates there may
be more at stake than market trade-offs. 48 It is, therefore, dangerous to let
the economists dictate all of the questions a judge may ask, since that means
cutting off the development of facts and evidence which might illuminate even
more brightly the underlying issues. 4 9 In areas involving fundamental
constitutional morality, compelling critiques like Judge Spaeth's can lead to
the conclusion that economic analysis has little or no legitimate place.
In between are the grey areas in which a judge needs to inspect the
underlying assumptions of economic behavior with caution before
wholeheartedly embracing them. For example, one key aspect of economics is
43. Spaeth, supra note 40, at 11, 48.
44. Nichol, Book Review, 93 YALE L.J. 171, 186-87 (1983).
45. Tribe, supra note 39, at 612-13, 620-21; Spaeth, supra note 40, at 48.
46. Spaeth, supra note 40, at 48.
47.

Brandl, Distilling Frenzy From Academic Scribbling: How Economics Influences Politicians, 4 J. POL'Y
344, 344 (1985).
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its focus on the individual as a rational maximizer of wealth. Ajudge might be
reluctant to apply neoclassical economic analysis to family law if she believes
that this vision of the individual should not apply in the family setting, 50 or if
she is attracted to the ideas of analysts who see the "code of kinship" as an
anthropological exception to the maxim of self-interest. 5' More generally,
Professor Cooter has suggested that it is liberty, not wealth, that people most
want to maximize. 52 Other areas of the law may similarly require that
behavioral norms and expectations be derived from the context of people's
membership in a group rather than as isolated "Lone Rangers" in a pervasive
marketplace.

53

In short, if economics is about individual decisionmakers engaged in
bargaining transactions where all choices count equally, it will not be suited to
solving legal problems which involve fundamentally different aspects of life
and society. At a minimum, in questionable cases judges ought to give the
parties a choice to opt out of the economic approach by pinpointing the
assumptions of economic analysis which make it unsuitable in their case.
B.

Limitations Based on the Language of Economics

Peculiar problems arise from the use of economic analysis, because the
language itself can cloud, rather than clarify the legal issues. Furthermore,
phrasing the issues in the mathematical equations of quantitative economics
usually does not help matters. 54 Economic language is a carrier for, and thus
no more neutral than, the economic assumptions it conveys. Perhaps in
belated recognition of this fact, law and economics scholars have somewhat
humorously attempted to popularize their language with references to Jobs as
55
Dam Sites, The Marketfor "Lemons," and the Economics of Caste and the Rat Race.
Economic language-in some cases economic jargon-can be used to
make controversial outcomes seem obvious. Cost-benefit concepts such as
"opportunity cost," "production function," and "comparative advantage"
sound wise and neutral but may be neither. Candid economists admit that if
judges analyze problems in these terms, the battle is all but won; economists
always have the solutions to self-defined problems. Often just framing an
issue as an "externality," a "public good," a "monopoly," or a "service"
makes the solution pre-ordained.
50. Kornhauser, A Guide to the Perplexed Claims of Efficiency in the Law, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 591, 637
(1980); see also Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV.
1497, 1524-25 (1983) (using assumptions about family life to critique market assumptions).
51. Hirshleifer, supra note 5, at 26, 45-46.
52. See R. COOTER, LIBERTY, EFFICIENCY, AND THE COMMON LAW (1986).
53. See, e.g., Sax, The Legitimacy of Collective Values: The Case of the Public Lands, 56 U. COLO. L. REV.
537 (1985) (environmental law); Spiegelman, Court-OrderedHiring Quotas After Stotts: A Narrativeon the
Role of the Web & the Ladder in Employment Discrimination Doctrine, 20 HARV. L. REV. 339 (1985)
(employment discrimination law).
54. See American Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Hospital Prod. Ltd., 780 F.2d 589, 593 (7th Cir. 1986)
(Posner, J.) (reduction of traditional standard for preliminary injunction to a mathematical equation).
55. G. AKERLOF, supra note 9, chs. 2, 3 & 6.
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There is thus a danger that judges will use the language of economic
analysis to disguise, or make more credible, nothing more than a generalized
balancing of interests. As Judge Bork has pointed out, ajudge is not engaging
in a genuine cost-benefit analysis merely because she balances competing
interests in a case. 5 6 True cost-benefit analysis requires the judge to weigh
factors which are comparable, and this often involves translating them into
monetary terms. When a judge simply weighs competing values which have
no common denominator, she engages in traditional legal, not economic,
analysis. Similarly, for a true economic analysis, the judge must have some
economically acceptable basis for deciding what is a cost and what is a benefit,
and for assigning societal values to the various costs and benefits. 57 If the
judge is simply speculating on the future consequences of the legal rule under
consideration, she can delude herself and others by labeling it as an economic
analysis and arriving at a conclusion based on the language, rather than on
the content, of the terms used.
The language of economics in general, and cost-benefit analysis in
particular, is not only difficult for noneconomists to work with and
understand, it is also often distinctly unsatisfying as a way of rationalizing or
explaining legal outcomes. Many judges and litigants will feel cheated when
their legal fates and valuable liberties are sealed by decisions couched in
economic terms. Professor Laurence Tribe has noted that "[B]eing 'assigned'
a right on efficiency grounds, after an appraisal of the relevant cost curves,
hardly satisfies the particular human need that can be met only by a shared
social and legal understanding [of why] the right belongs to the individual." 5 8
This is true not only in the constitutional context where, as Judge Spaeth has
warned, "critical passions will be aroused when issues of such fundamental
importance as religious freedom are analyzed in terms as barren as a balance
of costs and benefits," 5 9 but in other situations as well. Judge Bork has
perceptively noted that nothing "is really gained in rigor, in sophistication, in
precision, or in enlightenment, by restating . . . [some legal] problems in
'60
terms of cost-benefit analysis."
The role of language in economics is paramount, so the move to enhance
the role of economic analysis in the law is a move to change the nature of legal
discourse. Yet it makes no sense to adopt a new language unless that medium
does a better job of explaining and facilitating the decision of legal problems
than our current vocabulary. Judges should constantly ask how much is
gained in precision and enlightenment before going to the trouble of
restating any legal question in economic terms.

56.
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59.
60.
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V

How (NOT)

TO USE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

An additional set of limits also requires discussion: those which arise in
deciding how to use economic analysis when it is warranted. Judicial use of
economic predictive techniques, like ex ante analysis, and the area of statutory
interpretation merit special attention.
A.

Use of Economic Forecasting Techniques

Judge Eastberbrook has admonished judges to view cases from an ex ante
perspective and to analyze how their decisions will affect the behavior of
individuals or firms at the margin. Ex ante analysis involves looking beyond
the instant controversy to situations involving other persons who have not yet
acted, and attempting to predict their behavior in response to one or another
incentive or disincentive. Marginal analysis complements ex ante analysis by
directing the focus of judges "on the margin" where people can substitute
61
one product or kind of behavior for another.
One example Judge Eastberbrook employs to illustrate both ex ante and
marginal analysis is Blum v. Stenson. 62 In this case the Supreme Court held that
public interest lawyers should be reimbursed under statutes providing for
attorneys' fees at the same rate as private counsel with equivalent experience.
The Court rejected the defendants' ex post argument that, since the case had
already been brought and paid for, all the public interest lawyers needed were
their actual costs plus a fair profit. 63 Instead, the Court adopted the ex ante
perspective that other worthy cases might never be brought unless lawyers are
attracted to public interest practice by comparable pay. 6 4 Similarly, the
defendants' argument focused on average costs, that is whether the fees
awarded would be high enough to keep the public interest group in business
given the sum total of its resources. The Court, however, assumed that the
public interest group's decisionmaking would take place at the margin; it
would bring the next case only if the anticipated marginal benefits, which are
a function of the size of the fee award discounted by the probability of
winning, would exceed its marginal costs.

65

That example sounds eminently reasonable, and surely there are many
other cases in which the ex ante and marginal approaches make sense. But
inevitably there are more difficult cases where just telling judges to view
problems from an ex ante perspective will not help them to identify the
myriad of possible situations that one decision or another might affect, or
even which situations are more important than the rest. The outcome of ex
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
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ante analysis-and of forecasting on the margin-depends on one's
perspective, the questions one asks, and the breadth of one's imagination.
In his analysis of the opinion in Allen v. Wright,6 6 for instance, Judge
Easterbrook assumes that the IRS makes enforcement decisions at the margin
by comparing one case to another, rather than by evaluating cases against an
abstract standard of performance. 6 7 While that may sometimes be true, at
other times agencies must allocate enforcement resources in conformity with
explicit statutory commands, and in those cases courts may hold the agency to
a fixed standard of performance. 6 8 In still other cases, the court must
supplement marginal analysis with an assessment of how its proposed ruling
will affect average or overall activity levels. Professor Mark Kelman uses the
example of a polluter who might be permitted to continue operation under a
marginal analysis even though the most efficient outcome, when overall
activity levels are considered, is to close the plant. 69 In short, a call for
marginal analysis offers judges only a directional signal, not a fixed course.
Currently, most judges confine the scope of their forecasting to future
situations which have been raised by the parties before them, or which their
common sense tells them might occur. It is not at all clear how a purposeful
ex ante marginal viewpoint would change the boundaries of the predictive
exercise. If indeed the discipline of economics can really help us in defining
how far to widen our lens and how to locate the margins, perhaps a critical
task-not yet undertaken-is to explain the process and mechanics to
economically unsophisticated judges.
Another fundamental problem with marginal analysis is deciding whether
to accept the economists' vision of how people will respond to economic
incentives. Professor Lewis Kornhauser believes that economic theory is
likely to be a plausible predictor of corporate behavior because corporations
make decisions as rational, economic agents. However, he also thinks
economics is much less of an accurate predictor of the behavior of individuals
who often "act on grounds that economists would not consider 'rational.' "70
Real people-with all their intellectual, emotional, and physical
idiosyncrasies-are not as bound to marginal costs and benefits as are the
economists' rational maximizers. "Just as traditional French cooking does not
use seaweed or raw fish," one authority has noted, "so neoclassical models do
not make assumptions derived from psychology, anthropology, or
sociology." 7i Although a few second wave law and economics people do
acknowledge that primal emotions-such as love, rage, jealousy, and
66.
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altruism-and alliances among families, tribes, and groups are important
anthropological restraints on self-interested behavior, too many economists
ignore them. 72 While irrational or even altruistic behavior may have no place
in the world of neoclassical economics, it is pervasive in the world of law.
Much litigation, in fact, arises out of irrational behavior. The ex ante
perspective instructs the judge to look beyond the parties' prior irrational or
altruistic behavior. But in doing so, it seems reasonable for the judge to
assume that, having happened once, irrational and altruistic behavior will
occur again in the future.
In short, economic forecasting techniques help to frame the type of
inquiry that ajudge should conduct in order to assess the consequences of her
decision in advance. Unfortunately, the techniques of ex ante and marginal
analysis offer only the broadest of guidance as to what judges should look at
or for in any particular case. In addition, they implicitly require the judge to
accept and indeed encourage a sometimes counterintuitive notion that
people's behavior will generally be based on maximizing their self-interest.
For many of us, they suggest one but not the only base to touch in judicial
decisionmaking.
B.

Statutory Construction

Judges on our court spend the greatest part of their time construing
statutes. Here, too, ardent legal economists, chiefly Judges Posner and
Easterbrook, have formulated a concept of statutory construction based on
the economists' theory of how the legislative process operates. Their
approach, however, is by no means universally accepted by all the law and
economics commentators. 73 Under this standard, laws are bought and sold
just like other commodities; because some special interest groups can make
their demands more effectively than others in the legislative forum, many, if
not most, laws further private, rather than public, interests. Such private
interest laws are, in effect, "deals" between legislators and special interest
groups and courts should construe them narrowly in order to enforce the
deals according to their terms. On the other hand, those few laws which are
truly enacted to serve the public interest should be construed broadly to
74
effectuate their public purpose.
This approach to statutory construction spawns problems at two different
levels. First, the validity of its theory is dubious and an inconsistency exists
between this theory and other parts of law and economics ideology. Second,
in light of current Supreme Court precedent about the role of agencies in
statutory construction, difficulty arises for judges in incorporating the theory
into federal jurisprudence.
All of us who have worked on legislation know the old saying about laws
and sausage: No one should look into how either is made. We are also aware
72.
73.
74.
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of Mark Twain's caution that "no man is safe while Congress is in session."
There is a difference, however, between acknowledging the reality of
lobbyists, PACs, and dealmaking, and building a theory of statutory construction that allows judges to demote the importance of the end product
because of flaws in that process.
If legislators and special interest groups bargain about laws in a political
marketplace, and if the marketplace is such an efficient allocator of resources
for all other purposes, why is legislation the only market transaction
consistently presumed to come out "wrong" in terms of efficiency? Professor
Hovencamp, among others, has argued that the political marketplace is as
likely to be as efficient as any other, and criticized the trade-off method of
statutory construction as "manifestly inconsistent with the general Chicago
theory that when a market speaks-even a political market-the presumption
is very strong that it should be listened to." 75 Other commentators similarly
challenge the Chicago School's view of the comparative efficiency quotient of
courts and legislatures. They suggest that statutory solutions are generally
efficient and should be accorded preference over the common law whose
76
inefficiencies, they claim, spurred the codification movement.
The position that courts tend to make wealth maximizing decisions but
legislatures do not has some troublesome political and jurisprudential
implications, for it elevates the judiciary as societal decisionmakers at the
expense of the legislature. Because economists' "interest group theory [of
legislation leads] to suspicion about much of what Congress does, [it creates]
a climate hospitable to judicial interference with legislative outcomes." 7 7 The
economists' move to equate public interest statutes with efficiency and special
interest statutes with inefficiency "is little more than an attempt to force a
particular concept of efficiency into the democratic marketplace. ' 78 The
result of the economists' "insight" is thus to reduce judges' incentives to
exercise self-restraint in encroaching on the prerogatives of the legislaturesomething that the economists who are proponents of structural, separationof-powers judicial restraint should abhor.
A related problem grows out of Professor Tribe's observation that treating
"statutes as commodities, and lawmaking as little more than logrolling, ...
tends to demean the law and drain politics of its moral and intellectual
content." 79 Many judges would probably be nervous about a method of
statutory construction which unquestionably accepts and even advances this
slightly seamy view of our coordinate branch. However, even ifjudges believe
that Congress is prone to passing harmful legislation because of flaws in the
political marketplace, they may just as likely react not by enforcing the antipublic-interest deal as made, but rather by resorting to more traditional
75. Hovencamp, supra note 48, at 255 & n.198.
76. Note, supra note 10, at 885-87.
77. Macey, Promoting Public-RegardingLegislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group
Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 224 (1986).
78. Hovencamp, supra note 48, at 253.
79. Tribe, supra note 39, at 616 & n.146.
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modes of statutory construction which can "transform statutes designed to
benefit narrow interest groups into statutes that in fact further the public
interest." 80 Professor Jonathan Macey has explained that judges who stick
with traditional methods of construction, focusing on the words of a statute
rather than its origins, may well interpret the broad public interest language
in which legislative deals are often disguised to "reach a result that serves the
public interest, but fails to honor the terms of the original deal between the
legislature and the interest group." 8' Thus, it does not follow from the
economists' cynical vision of the legislative process that judges will follow
their narrow approach to judicial review.
The economists' general theory of statutes is supplemented by Judge
Easterbrook's meta-rule of construction: A statute should not be applied to
any but those situations expressly mentioned by the drafters, unless the
legislature explicitly delegated to the courts the power to create or revise a
form of common law in a certain area.8 2 Because Congress rarely does the
latter, this rule means that most law is left up to the private parties and most
disputes between private parties are left to be decided by judge-made law. In
Judge Easterbrook's' words, "[a]ll things are permitted unless there is some
contrary rule." 83 This approach to statutory construction increases the costs

of public interest legislation by forcing a legislature to be very explicit
whenever it wants to act in the public interest. Thus, this seemingly "neutral"
theory of statutory construction leads inexorably to more narrow consruction
of more statutes and to more private governance. This translates roughly into
more power for, and less regulation of, those who do not need laws to protect

them.
Another problem is how judges can distinguish between private interest
and public interest laws. In the absence of fraud or bribery, judges
traditionally do not probe into the motives of legislators, but restrict
themselves to determining the express intent or purpose of legislative
action. 8 4 Not only is legislative motive difficult to ascertain, but in many cases
legislators' motives-like the legislation they spawn-are mixed: A hand to a
friendly group here, a bone to the public interest there. Errors in ascertaining
legislative intent will be costly; whenever judges "mistakenly interpret public
interest statutes as special interest statutes ...

some interest group receives a

85
windfall at the expense of the public."
As an alternative to investigating motive, Judge Easterbrook suggests
looking at whether the statutory language is general or specific, whether there
are any "indicia of rent-seeking legislation" (such self-serving provisions for a
particular group as limits on entry or subsidies), and what went on during the
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process of passing the bill. 86 It is difficult to envision judges redirecting a

major part of their efforts to exploring what "deal" was actually cut in the
corridors and backrooms of Congress, or even taking "judicial notice" of the
horsetrading we all know goes on. As one critic has written, "jj]udges
interpret statutes; they are not investigative reporters." 8 7 Furthermore, that
which may be an indicium of rent-seeking legislation for one judge could be a
sign of public interest for another. Professor Tribe'S example of a rent
control ordinance may look like a private interest bill to an economist while
striking many people as a public interest initiative designed for the betterment
88
of the whole community.
Finally, as a sitting judge I must note that even if economically-devout
judges could somehow overcome all of these hurdles and decide whether the
statutory provision was a public interest enactment to be construed broadly or
a private interest law to be construed narrowly, their exercise would be largely
useless under the Chevron Supreme Court precedent. Since the Court's
Chevron decision, 89 a court must defer to an agency's interpretation of a
statute unless Congress has spoken clearly on the specific interpretation or
the agency's interpretation is so out of sync with the statute that it would
accomplish an absurd result. Absent these two situations, if there is ambiguity
in the statute-and who would doubt that a determined judge can always find
an ambiguity 9 0 -the court must seriously consider deferring to the agency's
interpretation.
The law and economics proponents' views of administrative agencies run
180 degrees counter to the deference required by the Chevron approach: They
see administrative agencies as interlopers in the process of statutory
construction. Unlike the courts, agencies never will be content to enforce the
basic deal cut in Congress. In the economists' view, private interests press for
the creation of agencies in order to circumvent the courts and create "a form
of 'dependent' judiciary designed to promote the operation of interest group
politics rather than allocative efficiency." 91 The Supreme Court precedent
thus poses a serious impediment to implementing the economists' theory of
statutory construction, at least where an agency has first crack at
interpretation. Legal economists may have to aim their fire more directly at
either the administrative agencies or the Supreme Court itself.

86. Easterbrook, supra note 19, at 16-17.
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VI
CONCLUSION

There are distinct limits to the methodology of law and economics at both
the macro level of theory and the micro level of application. Because
economic theory is constantly being debated among legal academics, judges
may draw on many sources to form their own views on this level of the debate.
There is no similar body of literature, however, which addresses questions
about the application of these theories. Case studies are needed on how to
conduct economic analyses in our present resource-poor, adversarial system
and on how the results might differ from our usual judicial fumblings.
It is unlikely that anyone will convince most sitting judges to adopt one
decisionmaking technique or framework of analysis for every case, especially if
that framework incorporates powerful and controversial assumptions. On the
other hand, judges are always looking for new tools to add to their existing
array of analytic techniques, hoping to make their opinions tighter and
righter. Before using such tools, however, other judges will ask many of the
same questions posed here. Can these techniques be used in some cases
without accepting and advancing critical premises of the whole law and
economics school? In which cases should these techniques be used? What
happens when the parties have not framed their dispute in economic terms?
How can the language be adapted to make it comprehensible to fellow judges,
to the parties, and to the decisionmakers themselves? Is it necessary to
predict people's behavior on the assumption that they always maximize wealth
for themselves? How do these techniques fit into rules of statutory
construction laid down by the Supreme Court?
My own conclusion is that economic analysis has growing importance in
judicial decisionmaking and may often be more useful than the rudimentary
analytic techniques to which courts have traditionally adhered. Judges are
eager for more enlightenment on when and how to use this analysis. There
are, however, some core beliefs that many judges share about the function of
law and courts in our society that will always rise above the rules of the
economists' marketplace. Because some of the economists' assumptions and
theories are neither intuitively persuasive, nor documented to any degree, I
would find it premature to adopt them as tenets for a comprehensive
jurisprudential philosophy. I am particularly troubled by the major shifts in
the roles and balance of power among the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches which legal economists seem to advocate. At this point, I am (and I
would guess many other judges are) content to be labelled an economically
aware, but not an economically sophisticated, judge.

